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Hyperproperties, such as non-interference and observational determinism, re-
late multiple system executions to each other. They are not expressible in stan-
dard temporal logics, like LTL, CTL, and CTL*, and thus cannot be monitored
with standard runtime verification techniques. HyperLTL extends linear-time
temporal logic (LTL) with explicit quantification over traces in order to express
Hyperproperties. We investigate the runtime verification problem of HyperLTL
formulas for three different input models: (1) The parallel model, where a fixed
number of system executions is processed in parallel. (2) The unbounded sequen-
tial model, where system executions are processed sequentially, one execution at
a time. In this model, the number of incoming executions may grow forever. (3)
The bounded sequential model where the traces are processed sequentially and
the number of incoming executions is bounded. We show that deciding moni-
torability of HyperLTL formulas is PSpace-complete for input models (1) and
(3). Deciding monitorability is PSpace-complete for alternation-free HyperLTL
formulas in input model (2). For every input model, we provide practical mon-
itoring algorithms. We also present various optimization techniques. By recog-
nizing properties of specifications such as reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity,
we reduce the number of comparisons between traces. For the sequential mod-
els, we present a technique that minimized the number of traces that need to
be stored. Finally, we provide an optimization that succinctly represents the
stored traces by sharing common prefixes. We evaluate our optimizations, show-
ing that this leads to much more scalable monitoring, in particular, significantly
lower memory consumption.
Keywords: Hyperproperties · Runtime Verification ·Monitoring · Information-
flow
1 Introduction
Hyperproperties [10] generalize trace properties in that they not only check the
correctness of individual traces, but can also relate multiple computation traces
to each other. This is needed, for example, to express information flow security
? This work was partially supported by the European Research Council (ERC) Grant
OSARES (No. 683300) and as part of the Collaborative Research Center Methods
and Tools for Understanding and Controlling Privacy (SFB 1223) by the German
Research Foundation (DFG).
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2 Finkbeiner, Hahn, Stenger, Tentrup
policies like the requirement that the system behavior appears to be determin-
istic, i.e., independent of certain secrets, to an external observer. Monitoring
hyperproperties is difficult, because it is no longer possible to analyze traces in
isolation: a violation of a hyperproperty in general involves a set of traces, not
just a single trace.
We present monitoring algorithms for hyperproperties given in the temporal
logic HyperLTL [9], which extends linear-time temporal logic (LTL) with trace
variables and trace quantifiers in order to refer to multiple traces at a time. For
example, the HyperLTL formula
∀pi.∃pi′. dummyInputpi′ ∧ lowOutpi = lowOutpi′
expresses noninference by stating that for all traces pi, there exists a trace pi′,
such that the observable outputs are the same on both traces even when the
high security input of pi′ being replaced by a dummy input. For example, in
a messaging app, we might replace the address book, which we want to keep
secret, with an empty address book.
A first, and absolutely fundamental, question to be answered is in what
form the input, which now consists of more than one execution trace, should be
presented to the monitor. Should the traces be presented all at once or one at
a time? Is the number of traces known in advance? Obviously, the choice of the
input representation has significant impact both on the principal monitoriability
of a hyperproperty and on the actual monitoring algorithm.
We study three basic input models for monitoring hyperproperties. (1) The
parallel model, where a fixed number of system executions is processed in paral-
lel. (2) The unbounded sequential model, where system executions are processed
sequentially, one execution at a time. In this model, the number of incoming
executions is a-priori unbounded and may in fact grow forever. (3) The bounded
sequential model where the traces are processed sequentially and the number of
incoming executions is bounded.
Parallel model. The assumption that the number of incoming traces is fixed be-
fore the actual monitoring process starts, results in the easiest and most efficient
monitoring algorithms. We distinguish online monitoring, where the traces be-
come available one position at a time from left to right, from offline monitoring
where the positions of the traces can be accessed in any order. In particular,
offline algorithms can traverse the traces in backwards direction, which is more
efficient. Figure 1 illustrates the two types of algorithms. The parallel model
is known from techniques like secure-multi-execution [12], where several system
executions are generated by providing different high-security inputs. We present
an online and an offline monitoring algorithm for hyperproperties expressed in
HyperLTL. The online algorithm is based on standard techniques for building
monitoring automata from LTL formulas. Such a monitor automaton is then
instantiated for multiple traces as specified by the HyperLTL formula. The of-
fline algorithm is based on constructing an alternating automaton and then
proceeding through the automaton in a bottom-up fashion, similar to the classic
construction for LTL [19].
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Fig. 1: Monitor approaches for the fixed size model: online in a forward fashion
(left) and offline in a backwards fashion (right).
Unbounded and bounded sequential model. The sequential models are useful when
multiple sessions of a system under observation have to be monitored one after
the other in an online fashion. The disadvantage of the unbounded sequential
model is that many interesting hyperproperties, in particular most hyperproper-
ties with quantifier alternations, are not monitorable in this model. It is therefore
often useful to define a stop condition in the form of a bound on the number of
traces that need to be handled during the monitoring process. Figure 2 sketches
Fig. 2: Monitor approaches for the sequential models: an unbounded number of
traces (left) and bounded number of traces (right) are processed sequentially.
the monitoring algorithm for the unbounded and bounded cases.
A naive monitoring approach for the sequential models would be to simply
store all traces seen so far. However, this would create two problems: a memory
problem, because the needed memory grows with the number of traces observed
by the monitor, and a runtime problem, because one needs to relate every newly
observed trace against the growing set of stored traces.
There are hyperproperties where this effect cannot be avoided. An example is
the hyperproperty with two atomic propositions p and q, where any pair of traces
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that agree on their p labeling must also agree on their q labeling. Clearly, for every
p labeling seen so far, we must also store the corresponding q labeling. In practice,
however, it is often possible to greatly simplify the monitoring. Consider, for
example, the hyperproperty that states that all traces have the same q labeling
(independently of the p labeling). In HyperLTL, this property is specified as the
formula
∀pi.∀pi′. (qpi↔qpi′).
The naive approach would store all traces seen so far, and thus require O(n)
memory after n traces. A new trace would be compared against every stored
trace twice, once as pi and once as pi′, resulting in a O(2n) running time for
each new trace. Obviously, however, in this example it is sufficient to store the
first trace, and compare all further incoming traces against this reference. The
required memory is thus, in fact, constant in the number of traces. A further
observation is that the specification is symmetric in pi and pi′. Hence, a single
comparison suffices.
In this article, we present a monitoring approach for hyperproperties in the
unbounded model that reduces the set of traces that new traces must be com-
pared against to a minimal subset. Our approach comes with a strong correctness
guarantee: our monitor produces the same verdict as a naive monitor that would
store all traces and, additionally, we keep a sufficient set of traces to always pro-
vide an actually observed witness for the monitoring verdict. Our monitoring
thus delivers a result that is equally informative as the naive solution, but is
computed faster and with less memory.
We introduce two analysis techniques and an optimized succinct representa-
tion of the trace set to be monitored: The trace analysis reduces the stored set
of traces to a minimum, thus minimizing the required memory. The specification
analysis, which is applicable in the parallel model as well, identifies symmetry,
transitivity, and reflexivity in the specification, in order to reduce the algorithmic
workload that needs to be carried out on the stored traces. The tries represen-
tation exploits the often prefix-equal traces in the incoming trace set, by storing
them in a tree-like data structure called tries.
Trace Analysis. As an example for a system where confidentiality and informa-
tion flow is of outstanding importance for the intended operation, we consider
a conference management system. There are a number of confidentiality prop-
erties that such a system should satisfy, like “The final decision of the program
committee remains secret until the notification” and “All intermediate decisions
of the program committee are never revealed to the author”. We want to focus
on important hyperproperties of interest beyond confidentiality, like the prop-
erty that no paper submission is lost or delayed. Informally, one formulation of
this property is “A paper submission is immediately visible for every program
committee member”. More formally, this property relates pairs of traces, one
belonging to an author and one belonging to a program committee member. We
assume this separation is indicated by a proposition pc that is either disabled
or enabled in the first component of those traces. Further propositions in our
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example are the proposition s, denoting that a paper has been submitted, and
v denoting that the paper is visible.
Given a set of traces T , we can verify that the property holds by checking ev-
ery pair of traces (t, t′) ∈ T ×T with pc /∈ t[0] and pc ∈ t′[0] that s ∈ t[i] implies
v ∈ t′[i + 1] for every i ≥ 0. When T satisfies the property, T ∪ {t∗}, where t∗
is a new trace, amounts to checking new pairs (t∗, t) and (t, t∗) for t ∈ T . This,
however, leads to an increasing size of T and thereby to an increased number of
checks: the monitoring problem becomes inevitable costlier over time. To circum-
vent this, we present a method that keeps the set of traces minimal with respect
to the underlying property. When monitoring hyperproperties, traces may pose
requirements on future traces. The core idea of our approach is to characterize
traces that pose strictly stronger requirements on future traces than others. In
this case, the traces with the weaker requirements can be safely discarded. As
an example, consider the following set of traces
{s} {} {} {} {} an author immediately submits a paper (1)
{} {s} {} {} {} an author submits a paper after one time unit (2)
{} {s} {s} {} {} an author submits two papers (3)
A satisfying PC trace would be {pc}{v}{v}{v}∅ as there are author traces with
paper submissions at time step 0, 1, and 2. For checking our property, one can
safely discard trace 2 as it poses no more requirements than trace 3. We say that
trace 3 dominates trace 2. We show that, given a property in the temporal logic
HyperLTL, we can automatically reduce trace sets to be minimal with respect
to this dominance. On relevant and more complex information flow properties,
this reduces the memory consumption dramatically.
Specification Analysis. For expressing hyperproperties, we use the recently in-
troduced temporal logic HyperLTL [9], which extends linear-time temporal logic
(LTL) [24] with explicit trace quantification. We construct a monitor template,
containing trace variables, from the HyperLTL formula. We initialize this mon-
itor with explicit traces resulting in a family of monitors checking the relation,
defined by the hyperproperty, between the traces. Our specification analysis
technique allows us to reduce the number of monitors in order to detect viola-
tion or satisfaction of a given HyperLTL formula. We use the decision procedure
for the satisfiability problem of HyperLTL [15] to check whether or not a uni-
versally quantified HyperLTL formula is symmetric, transitive, or reflexive. If a
hyperproperty is symmetric, then we can omit every symmetric monitor, thus,
performing only half of the language membership tests. A canonical example for
a symmetric HyperLTL formula is
∀pi.∀pi′. (Opi = Opi′)W (Ipi 6= Ipi′),
a variant of observational determinism [23, 26, 33]. Symmetry is particular in-
teresting, since many information flow policies have this property. If a hyper-
property is transitive, then we can omit every, except for one, monitor, since we
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can check every incoming trace against any reference trace. One example for a
transitive HyperLTL formula is equality
∀pi.∀pi′. (api ↔ api′).
If a hyperproperty is reflexive, then we can omit the monitor where every trace
variable is initialized with the same trace. For example, both hyperproperties
above are reflexive.
Trie representation. With the trace analysis, described above, we eliminate
traces that are dominated by new incoming traces. The trie representation is
an optimization that exploits prefix-equality of traces and therefore succinctly
represents traces that are similar, although not necessarily equal or dominated.
A trie is a tree-like data structure that can represent a set of traces as a tree,
where traces with equal prefixes collapse to the same path up to the point where
the traces differ. Exactly at this position, the trie branches. For example, con-
sider the finite traces τ = {on}n+1 and τ ′ = {on}n{off } and the hyperproperty
∀pi.∀pi′. (onpi ⊕ off pi′). Since none of the traces dominate each other, a monitor
would have to spawn four monitor instances (τ, τ ′), (τ ′, τ), (τ, τ), and (τ ′, τ ′). By
using the trie representation, only one monitor instance suffices up to position
n+ 1.
Structure of this Article. The remainder of this article is structured as follows.
Section 2 introduces the syntax and semantics of HyperLTL and the notion
of monitorable HyperLTL formula in all three input models. We furthermore
present algorithms for checking whether a HyperLTL formula is monitorable or
not. In Section 3, we give a finite trace semantics for HyperLTL. For the parallel
input model, we present an offline and online monitoring algorithm for arbitrarily
HyperLTL formulas. In Section 4, we present online algorithms for (universal)
HyperLTL formulas in the (unbounded) sequential model. We then tackle the
above mentioned memory explosion in by formally introducing the trace analysis,
hyperproperty analysis and the tries data structure sketched above. We report
on our implementation RVHyper v2 and experimental results in Section 5, before
concluding in Section 6.
This is a revised and extended version of a paper that appeared at
RV 2017 [17].
Related Work. The temporal logic HyperLTL was introduced to model check
security properties of reactive systems [9, 18]. For one of its predecessors,
SecLTL [13], there has been a proposal for a white box monitoring approach [14]
based on alternating automata. The problem of monitoring HyperLTL has been
considered before [1,7]. Agrawal and Bonakdarpour [1] gave a syntactic charac-
terization of monitorable HyperLTL formulas and a monitoring algorithm based
on Petri nets. In subsequent work, a constraint based approach has been pro-
posed [7]. Like our monitoring algorithm, they do not have access to the im-
plementation (black box), but in contrast to our work, they do not provide
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witnessing traces for a monitor verdict. For certain information flow policies,
like non-interference and some extensions, dynamic enforcement mechanisms
have been proposed. Techniques for the enforcement of information flow policies
include tracking dependencies at the hardware level [29], language-based moni-
tors [2,3,6,27,31], and abstraction-based dependency tracking [8,20,21]. Secure
multi-execution [12] is a technique that can enforce non-interference by executing
a program multiple times in different security levels. To enforce non-interference,
the inputs are replaced by default values whenever a program tries to read from
a higher security level.
2 Runtime Verification of HyperLTL
As Hyperproperties relate multiple executions to each other, a monitor for hy-
perproperties has to consider sets of traces instead of solely processing a single
execution in isolation. In this section, we elaborate on the runtime verification
problem of HyperLTL. In the first subsection, we present HyperLTL, which is
a temporal logic for expressing hyperproperties. In the second subsection, we
define the notion of monitorable HyperLTL specifications for three different in-
put models: the unbounded input model, the bounded model, and the parallel
model, which is a special case of the latter.
We begin by defining some notation. Let AP be a finite set of atomic propo-
sitions and let Σ = 2AP be the corresponding finite alphabet. A finite (infinite)
trace is a finite (infinite) sequence over Σ. We denote the concatenation of a
finite trace u ∈ Σ∗ and a finite or infinite trace v ∈ Σ∗ ∪ Σω by uv and write
u  v if u is a prefix of v. Further, we lift the prefix operator to sets of traces,
i.e., U  V := ∀u ∈ U.∃v ∈ V. u  v for U ⊆ Σ∗ and V ⊆ Σ∗ ∪Σω. We denote
the powerset of a set A by P(A) and define P∗(A) to be the set of all finite
subsets of A.
2.1 HyperLTL
HyperLTL [9] is a temporal logic for specifying hyperproperties. It extends
LTL [24] by quantification over trace variables pi and a method to link atomic
propositions to specific traces. The set of trace variables is V. Formulas in
HyperLTL are given by the grammar
ϕ ::= ∀pi. ϕ | ∃pi. ϕ | ψ , and
ψ ::= api | ¬ψ | ψ ∨ ψ | ψ | ψ U ψ ,
where a ∈ AP and pi ∈ V. We call a HyperLTL formula an LTL formula if it is
quantifier free. The semantics is given by the satisfaction relation P over a set of
traces T ⊆ Σω. We define an assignment Π : V → Σω that maps trace variables
to traces. Π[i,∞] denotes the trace assignment that is equal to Π(pi)[i,∞] for
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all pi.
Π T api if a ∈ Π(pi)[0]
Π T ¬ϕ if Π 2T ϕ
Π T ϕ ∨ ψ if Π T ϕ or Π T ψ
Π T ϕ if Π[1,∞] T ϕ
Π T ϕ U ψ if ∃i ≥ 0. Π[i,∞] T ψ ∧ ∀0 ≤ j < i.Π[j,∞] T ϕ
Π T ∃pi. ϕ if there is some t ∈ T such that Π[pi 7→ t] T ϕ
We write T  ϕ for {} T ϕ where {} denotes the empty assignment. The
language of a HyperLTL formula ϕ, denoted by L(ϕ), is the set {T ⊆ Σω | T 
ϕ}. Let ϕ be a HyperLTL formula with trace variables V = {pi1, . . . , pik} over
alphabet Σ. We define ΣV to be the alphabet where ppi is interpreted as an
atomic proposition for every p ∈ AP and pi ∈ V. We denote by LTL the LTL
satisfaction relation over ΣV . We define the pi-projection, denoted by #pi(s), for
a given s ⊆ ΣV and pi ∈ V, as the set of all ppi ∈ s.
Lemma 1. Let ψ be an LTL formula over trace variables V. There is a trace as-
signment A such that A ∅ ψ if, and only if, ψ is satisfiable under LTL semantics
over atomic propositions ΣV . The models can be translated effectively.
Proof. Assume that there is a trace assignment A over trace variables V such
that A ∅ ψ. We define w ⊆ ΣωV such that xpi ∈ w[i] if, and only if, x ∈ A(pi)[i]
for all i ≥ 0, x ∈ AP, and pi ∈ V. An induction over ψ shows that w LTL ψ.
Assume ψ is satisfiable for LTL, i.e., there exists a w ⊆ ΣωV , such that
w LTL ψ. We construct an assignment A in the following manner: Let pi ∈ V
be arbitrary. We map pi to the trace t obtained by projecting the corresponding
ppi ∈ ΣV , i.e., ∀i ≥ 0. t[i] = #pi(w[i]). uunionsq
2.2 Monitorability
In general, we distinguish between three different input models.
In the first model, the size of the trace set is not known in advance. Traces
are processed sequentially, i.e., given a set of traces T and a fresh trace t, the
monitoring algorithm has to decide whether T ∪ t satisfies or violates a given
HyperLTL formula before processing another fresh traces t′.
In the second model, we consider the special case of the sequential model,
where a maximal bound on the trace set is known. Figure 2 sketches how the
monitor processes the traces sequentially for the unbounded and bounded case.
In the third input model, which is a special case of the bounded model, we
assume that the set of execution traces is of fixed size and, furthermore, that
the traces are given at the same time. This models, for example, secure multi
execution, where multiple instances of a system are run in parallel. As shown
in [19] offline monitoring of future-time temporal formulas can be monitored
efficiently by processing a trace in a backwards fashion. Figure 1 sketches how a
monitor will process the traces in an online and offline fashion.
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In the remainder of this section, we present three notions of monitorability
for hyperproperties for every input model respectively. In the first subsection, we
will consider monitorability of HyperLTL formulas in the unbounded sequential
model, before considering the bounded sequential model and the parallel model.
We show that deciding whether alternation-free HyperLTL formulas are moni-
torable in the unbounded fragment is PSpace-complete, i.e., no harder than the
corresponding problem for LTL. Furthermore, we show that deciding whether
an arbitrary HyperLTL formula is monitorable in the bounded input model is
PSpace-complete as well. Those results extend earlier characterizations based
on restricted syntactic fragments of HyperLTL [1].
For trace languages, monitorability is the property whether language con-
tainment can be decided by finite prefixes [25]. Given a trace language L ⊆ Σω,
the set of good and bad prefixes is good(L) := {u ∈ Σ∗ | ∀v ∈ Σω. uv ∈ L}
and bad(L) := {u ∈ Σ∗ | ∀v ∈ Σω. uv /∈ L}, respectively. L is monitorable if
∀u ∈ Σ∗.∃v ∈ Σ∗. uv ∈ good(L)∨uv ∈ bad(L). The decision problem, i.e., given
an LTL formula ϕ, decide whether ϕ is monitorable, is PSpace-complete [4].
A hyperproperty H is a set of trace properties, i.e., H ⊆ P(Σω). Given H ⊆
P(Σω). The set of good and bad prefix traces is good(H) := {U ∈ P∗(Σ∗) | ∀V ∈
P(Σω). U  V ⇒ V ∈ H} and bad(H) := {U ∈ P∗(Σ∗) | ∀V ∈ P(Σω). U 
V ⇒ V /∈ H}, respectively.
Unbounded Sequential Model. A hyperproperty H is monitorable in the un-
bounded input model if
∀U ∈ P∗(Σ∗).∃V ∈ P∗(Σ∗). U  V ⇒ V ∈ good(H) ∨ V ∈ bad(H) .
With this definition, hardly any alternating HyperLTL formula is moni-
torable as their satisfaction cannot be characterized by a finite trace set, even for
safety properties. Consider, for example, the formula ϕ = ∀pi.∃pi′. (api → bpi′).
Assume a finite set of traces T does not violate the formula. Then, one can con-
struct a new trace t where a ∈ t[i] and b /∈ t[i] for some position i, and for all
traces t′ ∈ T it holds that b /∈ t′[i]. Thus, the new trace set violates ϕ. Likewise,
if there is a finite set of traces that violates ϕ, a sufficiently long trace containing
only b’s stops the violation.
However, we present a method to decide whether a HyperLTL formula in the
highly expressive fragment of quantifier alternation-free formulas is monitorable.
Lemma 2. Given a HyperLTL formula ϕ = ∀pi1 . . . ∀pik. ψ, where ψ is an LTL
formula. It holds that good(L(ϕ)) = ∅ unless ψ ≡ true.
Proof. If ψ ≡ true then L(ϕ) = P(Σω) and good(L(ϕ)) = P∗(Σ∗). Assume for
contradiction that ψ 6≡ true and good(L(ϕ)) 6= ∅, i.e., there is a finite set U ⊆ Σ∗
that is a good prefix set of ϕ. Since ψ 6= true, there is at least one infinite trace
σ with σ 2 ψ. We translate this trace to a set of infinite traces W where W 2 ϕ
using Lemma 1. Further, for all V ∈ P(Σ∗) with U  V , it holds that W ⊆ V ,
hence, V /∈ L(ϕ) violating the assumption that U ∈ good(L(ϕ)). uunionsq
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Theorem 1. Given a HyperLTL formula ϕ = ∀pi1 . . . ∀pik. ψ, where ψ 6≡ true
is an LTL formula. ϕ is monitorable if, and only if, ∀u ∈ Σ∗V .∃v ∈ Σ∗V . uv ∈
bad(L(ψ)).
Proof. Assume ∀u ∈ Σ∗V .∃v ∈ Σ∗V . uv ∈ bad(L(ψ)) holds. Given an arbitrary
prefix U ∈ P∗(Σ∗). Pick an arbitrary mapping from U to Σ∗V and call it u′. By
assumption, there is a v′ ∈ Σ∗V such that u′v′ ∈ bad(L(ψ)). We use this v′ to
extend the corresponding traces in U resulting in V ∈ P∗(Σ∗). It follows that
for all W ∈ P(Σω) with V W , W 2 ϕ, hence, V ∈ bad(L(ϕ)).
Assume ϕ is monitorable, thus, ∀U ∈ P∗(Σ∗).∃V ∈ P∗(Σ∗). U  V ⇒ V ∈
good(L(ϕ))∨V ∈ bad(L(ϕ)). As the set of good prefixes good(L(ϕ)) is empty by
Lemma 2 we can simplify the formula to ∀U ∈ P∗(Σ∗).∃V ∈ P∗(Σ∗). U  V ⇒
V ∈ bad(L(ϕ)). Given an arbitrary u ∈ Σ∗V , we translate it into the (canonical)
U ′ and get a V ′ satisfying the conditions above. Let v′ ∈ Σ∗V be the finite trace
constructed from the extensions of u in V ′ (not canonical, but all are bad prefixes
since V ′ ∈ bad(L(ϕ))). By assumption, u′v′ ∈ bad(L(ψ)). uunionsq
Corollary 1. Given a HyperLTL formula ϕ = ∃pi1 . . . ∃pik.ψ, where ψ is an LTL
formula. ϕ is monitorable if, and only if, ∀u ∈ Σ∗V .∃v ∈ Σ∗V . uv ∈ good(L(ψ)).
Theorem 2. Given an alternation-free HyperLTL formula ϕ. Deciding whether
ϕ is monitorable in the unbounded sequential model is PSpace-complete.
Proof. We consider the case that ϕ = ∀pi1 . . . ∀pi2. ψ, the case for existentially
quantified formulas is dual. We apply the characterization from Theorem 1.
First, we have to check validity of ψ which can be done in polynomial space [28].
Next, we have to determine whether ∀u ∈ Σ∗V .∃v ∈ Σ∗V . uv ∈ bad(L(ψ)). We
use a slight modification of the PSpace algorithm given by Bauer [4]. Hardness
follows as the problem is already PSpace-hard for LTL. uunionsq
Bounded Sequential Model. A Hyperproperty H is monitorable in the bounded
input model if
∀U ∈ P∗(Σ∗).∃V ∈ P∗(Σ∗). U  V ∧|U | = |V | ⇒ V ∈ good(H)∨V ∈ bad(H) .
Corollary 2. Given an arbitrarily HyperLTL formula ϕ. Deciding whether ϕ is
monitorable in the bounded sequential model is PSpace-complete.
Parallel Model. A Hyperproperty H is monitorable in the fixed size input model
if for a given bound b
∀U ∈ Pb(Σ∗).∃V ∈ Pb(Σ∗). U  V ⇒ V ∈ good(H) ∨ V ∈ bad(H) .
This is a special case of the monitorability notion for the bounded input model,
where the bound is fixed beforehand. Thus, the previous results are carried over
to this model.
Corollary 3. .Given an arbitrarily HyperLTL formula ϕ. Deciding whether ϕ
is monitorable in the parallel model is PSpace-complete.
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3 Monitoring Hyperproperties in the Parallel Model
We begin with the special case of the parallel model, where the set of traces is
fixed in advance. Therefore, the traces can be processed in parallel, either online
in a forward fashion, or offline in a backwards fashion. Before describing the
respective algorithms, we define the finite trace semantics for HyperLTL in the
next subsection.
3.1 Finite Trace Semantics
We define a finite trace semantics for HyperLTL based on the finite trace se-
mantics of LTL [22]. In the following, when using L(ϕ) we refer to the finite
trace semantics of a HyperLTL formula ϕ. Let t be a finite trace,  denotes the
empty trace, and |t| denotes the length of a trace. Since we are in a finite trace
setting, t[i, . . .] denotes the subsequence from position i to position |t| − 1. Let
Πfin : V → Σ∗ be a partial function mapping trace variables to finite traces.
We define [0] as the empty set. Πfin [i, . . .] denotes the trace assignment that is
equal to Πfin(pi)[i, . . .] for all pi. We define a subsequence of t as follows.
t[i, j] =
{
 if i ≥ |t|
t[i,min(j, |t| − 1)], otherwise
Πfin T api if a ∈ Πfin(pi)[0]
Πfin T ¬ϕ if Πfin 2T ϕ
Πfin T ϕ ∨ ψ if Πfin T ϕ or Πfin T ψ
Πfin T ϕ if Πfin [1, . . .] T ϕ
Πfin T ϕ U ψ if ∃i ≥ 0. Πfin [i, . . .] T ψ ∧ ∀0 ≤ j < i.Πfin [j, . . .] T ϕ
Πfin T ∃pi. ϕ if there is some t ∈ T such that Πfin [pi 7→ t] T ϕ
3.2 Monitoring Algorithm
In this subsection, we describe our automata-based monitoring algorithm for the
parallel model for HyperLTL. We present an online algorithm that processes the
traces in a forward fashion, and an offline algorithm that processes the traces
backwards.
Online Algorithm. For the online algorithm, we employ standard techniques for
building LTL monitoring automata and use this to instantiate this monitor by
the traces as specified by the HyperLTL formula. Let AP be a set of atomic
propositions and V = {pi1, . . . , pin} a set of trace variables. A deterministic mon-
itor template M = (Σ,Q, δ, q0) is a four tuple of a finite alphabet Σ = 2AP×V ,
a non-empty set of states Q, a partial transition function δ : Q×Σ ↪→ Q, and a
designated initial state q0 ∈ Q. The instantiated automaton runs in parallel over
traces in (2AP)∗, thus we define a run with respect to a n-ary tupleN ∈ ((2AP)∗)n
of finite traces. A run of N is a sequence of states q0q1 · · · qm ∈ Q∗, where m is
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q0
q2
q1 q3q4
¬pcpi ∧ pcpi′
¬sp
sp
vpi′
vpi′ ∧ sp
¬pcpi′
>
pcpi ∧ pcpi′
vpi ↔ vpi′
Fig. 3: Visualization of a monitor template corresponding to formula given in
Equation 4. We use a symbolic representation of the transition function δ.
the length of the smallest trace in N , starting in the initial state q0 such that
for all i with 0 ≤ i < m it holds that
δ
qi, n⋃
j=1
⋃
a∈N(j)(i)
{(a, pij)}
 = qi+1 .
A tuple N is accepted, if there is a run on M. For LTL, such a determinis-
tic monitor can be constructed in doubly-exponential time in the size of the
formula [11,30].
Example 1. We consider again the conference management example from the
introduction. We distinguish two types of traces, author traces and program
committee member traces, where the latter starts with proposition pc. Based on
this traces, we want to verify that no paper submission is lost, i.e., that every
submission (proposition s) is visible (proposition v) to every program committee
member in the following step. When comparing two PC traces, we require that
they agree on proposition v. The monitor template for the following HyperLTL
formalization is depicted in Fig. 3.
∀pi.∀pi′. ((¬pcpi∧pcpi′)→ (spi → vpi′))∧((pcpi∧pcpi′)→ (vpi ↔ v′pi)) (4)
The online algorithm is depicted in Fig. 4. It proceeds with the pace of the
incoming stream. We have a variable S that maps tuples of traces to states of
the deterministic monitor. Whenever a trace progresses, we update the states in
S according to the transition function δ. If on this progress, there is a violation,
we return the corresponding tuple of traces as a witness.
Offline Algorithm. For our efficient offline algorithm, we process the traces in a
backwards fashion. The basic idea is to use an alternating automaton, which can
be constructed in linear time, to find violations in the input set. The basic idea
is to progress through the automaton in a bottom up fashion while proceeding
backwards through the traces.
An alternating automaton [32], whose runs generalize from sequences to trees,
is a tuple A = (Q, q0, δ, Σ, F ). Q is the set of states, q0 is the initial state, Σ is
the alphabet, and F the set of accepting states. δ : Q×Σ → B+Q is a transition
function, which maps a state and a symbol into a boolean combination of states.
Thus, a run(-tree) of an alternating Bu¨chi automaton A on an infinite word w
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input : Qn HyperLTL formula ϕ
output: satisfied or n-ary tuple
witnessing violation
Mϕ = (Σ,Q, δ, q0) = build template(ϕ);
S : Tn → Q;
tn := (1, . . . , n);
while pn ← new elements (in a forward fashion) do
t := (t1 p1, . . . , tn pn);
progress every state in S according to δ;
if ♦1 . . .♦n t1 × · · · × tn has violation in Mϕ then
return witnessing tuple tn;
end
end
return satisfied;
Fig. 4: Online algorithm for the parallel model, where ♦i := ∧ if Qi = ∀ and ∨
otherwise.
is a Q-labeled tree. A word w is accepted by A and called a model if there exists
a run-tree T such that all paths p through T are accepting, i.e., Inf(p)∩ F 6= ∅.
Note that an alternating automata can be constructed in linear time from an
LTL formula [32].
The offline algorithm is depicted in Fig. 5. The input is an arbitrary Hyper-
LTL formula and a trace set T . After building the alternating automaton from
the suffix of the HyperLTL formula, we apply the backwards monitoring algo-
rithm [19] for each trace ti ∈ T . Depending on the quantifier prefix, we check the
n-fold combinations of the traces for satisfaction. The difference to the forward
algorithm is that we solely refer to previously computed values, resulting in a
highly efficient algorithm.
Theorem 3. Given a HyperLTL formula ϕ and a trace set T , the offline back-
wards algorithm for the parallel model runs in polynomial time in the size of the
formula and the length of the traces.
4 Monitoring Hyperproperties: Sequential
The algorithms for monitoring HyperLTL formulas in both sequential models
(unbounded and bounded) are presented in Fig. 6. After building the determin-
istic monitoring automaton Mϕ, the algorithm proceeds with the pace of the
incoming stream, which has an indicator when a new trace starts. We have a
variable S that maps tuples of traces to states of the deterministic monitor.
Whenever a trace progresses, we update the states in S according to the tran-
sition function δ. If during this process a violation is detected, we return the
corresponding tuple of traces as a witness. When a new trace t starts, only new
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input : HyperLTL formula Qn.ψ
trace set T
output: satisfied or n-ary tuple
witnessing violation
Aψ = (Σ,Q, δ, q0) = build alternating automaton(ψ);
booleans bn;
foreach ti ∈ T do
bi :=LTL backwards algorithm(Aψ,ti)
end
if b1♦1 . . .♦nbn then
return satisfied;
end
return witnessing tuple tn;
Fig. 5: Offline backwards algorithm for the parallel model, where ♦i := ∧ if
Qi = ∀ and ∨ otherwise.
tuples are considered for S, that are tuples N ∈ (T ∪ {t})n containing the new
trace t, i.e., N /∈ Tn. In the bounded case, the algorithm implements a stop-
condition, namely when the trace set T surpasses the given bound b. Note that
monitoring formulas with alternations becomes possible, as their satisfaction or
violation can be determined at least when the bound b is reached.
In contrast to previous approaches, our algorithm returns a witness for vi-
olation. This highly desired property comes with a price. In constructed worst
case scenarios, we have to remember every system trace in order to return an ex-
plicit witness. However, it turns out that practical hyperproperties satisfy certain
properties such that the majority of traces can be pruned during the monitoring
process.
4.1 Optimizations
The main obstacle in monitoring hyperproperties in the unbounded input model
is the potentially unbounded space consumption. In the following, we present
two analysis phases of our algorithm and describe how we incorporate tries at
the base of our implementation. The first phase is a specification analysis, which
is a preprocessing step that analyzes the HyperLTL formula under consideration.
We use the recently introduced satisfiability solver for hyperproperties EAHy-
per [16] to detect whether a formula is (1) symmetric, i.e., we halve the number
of instantiated monitors, (2) transitive, i.e, we reduce the number of instantiated
monitors to two, or (3) reflexive, i.e., we can omit the self comparison of traces.
The second analysis phase is applied during runtime. We analyze the incoming
trace to detect whether or not this trace poses strictly more requirements on
future traces, with respect to a given HyperLTL formula.
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input : ∀n HyperLTL formula ϕ (unbounded case)
HyperLTL formula ϕ and bound b (bounded case)
output: satisfied or n-ary tuple
witnessing violation
Mϕ = (Σ,Q, δ, q0) = build template(ϕ);
S : Tn → Q;
T := ∅;
t := ;
while p← new element do
if p is new trace (and |T | ≤ b in the bounded case) then
T ∪ {t};
t := ;
S := {q0 | for new n-tuple};
else
t := t p;
progress every state in S according to δ;
if violation then
return witnessing tuple;
end
end
end
return satisfied;
Fig. 6: Evaluation algorithm for monitoring ∀n HyperLTL formulas in the un-
bounded sequential model and monitoring arbitrary HyperLTL formulas in the
bounded sequential model.
Specification Analysis. Symmetry. Symmetry is particular interesting since
many information flow policies satisfy this property. Consider, for example, ob-
servational determinism ObsDet := ∀pi.∀pi′. (Opi = Opi′)W (Ipi 6= Ipi′). We detect
symmetry by translating this formula to a formula ObsDetsymm that is unsat-
isfiable if there exists no set of traces for which every trace pair violates the
symmetry condition:
ObsDetsymm := ∃pi.∃pi′.
(
(Opi = Opi′)W (Ipi 6= Ipi′)
)
=
(
(O′pi = Opi)W (I ′pi 6= Ipi)
)
This is a sufficient condition for the invariance of ObsDet under pi and pi′, which
we define in the following, and, therefore, ObsDet is symmetric.
Definition 1. Given a HyperLTL formula ϕ = ∀pi1 . . . ∀pin. ψ, where ψ is an
LTL formula over trace variables {pi1, . . . , pin}. We say ϕ is invariant under
trace variable permutation σ : V → V, if for any set of traces T ⊆ Σω and any
assignment Π : V → T , Π T ψ ⇔ (Π ◦ σ) T ψ. We say ϕ is symmetric, if it
is invariant under every trace variable permutation in V → V.
We generalize the previous example to formulas with more than two universal
quantifiers. We use the fact, that the symmetric group for a finite set V of n trace
variables is generated by the two permutations (pi1 pi2) and (pi1 pi2 · · · pin−1 pin).
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If the HyperLTL-SAT solver determines that the input formula is invariant under
these two permutations, then the formula is invariant under every trace variable
permutation and thus symmetric.
Theorem 4. Given a HyperLTL formula ϕ = ∀pi1 . . . ∀pin. ψ, where ψ is an
LTL formula over trace variables {pi1, . . . , pin}. ϕ is symmetric if and only
if ϕsymm = ∃pi1 . . . ∃pin. (ψ(pi1, pi2, . . . , pin−1, pin) = ψ(pi2, pi1, . . . , pin−1, pin))
∨(ψ(pi1, pi2, . . . , pin−1, pin) = ψ(pi2, pi3, . . . , pin, pi1)) is unsatisfiable.
Transitivity. While symmetric HyperLTL formulas allow us to prune half of the
monitor instances, transitivity of a HyperLTL formula has an even larger impact
on the required memory. Observational Determinism, considered above, is not
transitive. However, equality, i.e, EQ := ∀pi.∀pi′. (api ↔ api′), for example, is
transitive and symmetric and allow us to reduce the number of monitor instances
to one, since we can check equality against any reference trace.
Definition 2. Given a HyperLTL formula ϕ = ∀pi1.∀pi2. ψ, where ψ is an
LTL formula over trace variables {pi1, pi2}. Let T = {t1, t2, t3} ∈ Σω be
three-elemented set of traces. We define the assignment Πi,j : V → Σω by
Πi,j := {pi1 7→ ti, pi2 7→ tj}. We say ϕ is transitive, if T was chosen arbitrary
and (Π1,2 T ψ) ∧ (Π2,3 T ψ)⇒ Π1,3 T ψ.
Theorem 5. Given a HyperLTL formula ϕ = ∀pi1.∀pi2. ψ, where ψ is an LTL
formula over trace variables {pi1, pi2}. ϕ is transitive if and only if ϕtrans =
∃pi1∃pi2∃pi3. (ψ(pi1, pi2) ∧ ψ(pi2, pi3)) 9 ψ(pi1, pi3) is unsatisfiable.
Reflexivity. Lastly, we introduce a method to check whether a formula is reflex-
ive, which enables us to omit the composition of a trace with itself in the mon-
itoring algorithm. Both HyperLTL formulas considered in this section, ObsDet
and EQ , are reflexive.
Definition 3. Given a HyperLTL formula ϕ = ∀pi1 . . . ∀pin. ψ, where ψ is an
LTL formula over trace variables {pi1, . . . , pin}. We say ϕ is reflexive, if for any
trace t ∈ Σω and the corresponding assignment Π : V → {t}, Π {t} ψ.
Theorem 6. Given a HyperLTL formula ϕ = ∀pi1 . . . ∀pin. ψ, where ψ is an LTL
formula over trace variables {pi1, . . . , pin}. ϕ is reflexive if and only if ϕrefl =
∃pi.¬ψ(pi, pi, . . . , pi) is unsatisfiable.
Trace Analysis. In the previous subsection, we described a preprocessing step
to reduce the number of monitor instantiations. The main idea of the trace
analysis, considered in the following, is to check whether a trace contains new
requirements on the system under consideration. If this is not the case, then
this trace will not be stored by our monitoring algorithm. We denoteMϕ as the
monitor template of a ∀∗ HyperLTL formula ϕ.
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Definition 4. Given a HyperLTL formula ϕ, a trace set T and an arbitrary
t ∈ TR, we say that t is (T, ϕ)-redundant if T is a model of ϕ if and only if
T ∪ {t} is a model of ϕ as well. Formally denoted as follows.
∀T ′ ⊇ T. T ′ ∈ L(ϕ)⇔ T ′ ∪ {t} ∈ L(ϕ).
Example 2. Consider, again, our example hyperproperty for a conference man-
agement system. “A user submission is immediately visible for every program
committee member and every program committee member observes the same.”
We formalized this property as a ∀2 HyperLTL formula in Equation 4. Assume
our algorithm observes the following three traces of length five.
{} {s} {} {} {} an author submits a paper (5)
{} {} {s} {} {} an author submits a paper one time unit later (6)
{} {} {s} {s} {} an author submits two papers (7)
Trace 6 contains, with respect to ϕ above, no more information than trace 7.
We say that trace 7 dominates trace 6 and, hence, trace 6 may be pruned from
the set of traces that the algorithm has to store. If we consider a PC member
trace, we encounter the following situation.
{} {s} {} {} {} an author submits a paper (8)
{} {} {s} {s} {} an author submits two papers (9)
{} {pc} {v} {v} {v} a PC member observes three submissions (10)
Our algorithm will detect no violation, since the program committee member
sees all three papers. Intuitively, one might expect that no more traces can
be pruned from this trace set. However, in fact, trace 10 dominates trace 8 and
trace 9, since the information that three papers have been submitted is preserved
in trace 10. Hence, it suffices to remember the last trace to detect, for example,
the following violations.
{} {pc} {v} {v} {v} a PC member observes three submissions (11)
{} {pc} {v} {v} {} Ea PC member observes two submissions E (12)
or
{} {} {} {} {s} Ean author submits a non-visible paper E (13)
Note that none of the previous user traces, i.e., trace 5 to trace 9, are needed to
detect a violation.
Definition 5. Given t, t′ ∈ TR, we say t dominates t′ if t′ is ({t}, ϕ)-redundant.
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The observations from Example 2 can be generalized to a language inclusion
check (cf. Theorem 7), to determine whether a trace dominates another trace. For
proving this, we first prove the following two lemmas. For the sake of simplicity,
we consider ∀2 HyperLTL formulas. The proofs can be generalized. We denote
Mϕ[t/pi] as the monitor where trace variable pi of the template Monitor Mϕ is
initialized with explicit trace t.
Lemma 3. Let ϕ be a ∀2 HyperLTL formula over trace variables {pi1, pi2}. Given
an arbitrary trace set T and an arbitrary trace t, T ∪ {t} is a model of ϕ if and
only if T is still accepted by the following two monitors: (1) only pi1 is initialized
with t (2) only pi2 is initialized with t. Formally, the following equivalence holds.
∀T ⊆ TR,∀t ∈ TR. T ∪ {t} ∈ L(ϕ)⇔ T ⊆ L(Mϕ[t/pi1]) ∧ T ⊆ L(Mϕ[t/pi2])
Lemma 4. Given a ∀2 HyperLTL formula ϕ over trace variables V :=
{pi1, . . . , pin} and two traces t, t′ ∈ TR, the following holds: t dominates t′ if
and only if
L(Mϕ[t/pi1]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t′/pi1]) ∧ L(Mϕ[t/pi2]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t′/pi2])
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that (a) t dominates t′ and w.l.o.g.
(b) L(Mϕ[t/pi1]) * L(Mϕ[t′/pi1]). Thus, by definition of subset, there exists a
trace t˜ with t˜ ∈ L(Mϕ[t/pi1]) and t˜ 6∈ L(Mϕ[t′/pi1]). Hence, Π = {pi1 7→ t, pi2 7→
t˜} is a valid trace assignment, whereas Π ′ = {pi1 7→ t′, pi2 7→ t˜} is not. On the
other hand, from (a) the following holds by Definition 5: ∀T ′ with {t} ⊆ T ′ it
holds that T ′ ∈ L(ϕ) ⇔ T ′ ∪ {t′} ∈ L(ϕ). We choose T ′ as {t, t˜}, which is a
contradiction to the equivalence since we know from (a) that Π is a valid trace
assignment, but Π ′ is not a valid trace assignment.
For the other direction, assume that L(Mϕ[t/pi1]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t′/pi1]) and
L(Mϕ[t/pi2]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t′/pi2]). Let T ′ be arbitrary such that {t} ⊆ T ′. We
distinguish two cases:
– Case T ′ ∈ L(ϕ), then (a) T ′ ⊆ L(Mϕ[t/pi1]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t′/pi1]) and (b) T ′ ⊆
L(Mϕ[t/pi2]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t′/pi2]). By Lemma 3 and T ′ ∈ L(ϕ), it follows that
T ′ ∪ {t′} ∈ L(ϕ).
– Case T ′ /∈ L(ϕ), then T ′ ∪ {tˆ} /∈ L(ϕ) for an arbitrary trace tˆ.
A generalization leads to the following theorem, which serves as the foundation
of our trace storage minimization algorithm.
Theorem 7. Given a ∀n HyperLTL formula ϕ over trace variables V :=
{pi1, . . . , pin} and two traces t, t′ ∈ TR, the following holds: t dominates t′ if
and only if ∧
pi∈V
L(Mϕ[t/pi]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t′/pi]) .
The characterization of dominance for existential quantification is dual.
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input : ∀n HyperLTL formula ϕ,
redundancy free set of traces T
trace t
output: redundancy free set of traces Tmin ⊆ T ∪ {t}
Mϕ = build template(ϕ)
foreach t′ ∈ T do
if
∧
pi∈V L(Mϕ[t′/pi]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t/pi]) then
return T
end
end
foreach t′ ∈ T do
if
∧
pi∈V L(Mϕ[t/pi]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t′/pi]) then
T := T \ {t′}
end
end
return T ∪ {t}
Fig. 7: Storage Minimization Algorithm.
Lemma 5. Given an ∃2 HyperLTL formula ϕ over trace variables V :=
{pi1, . . . , pin} and two traces t, t′ ∈ TR, the following holds: t dominates t′ if
and only if
L(Mϕ[t′/pi1]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t/pi1]) ∧ L(Mϕ[t′/pi2]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t/pi2])
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that (a) t dominates t′ and w.l.o.g.
(b) L(Mϕ[t′/pi1]) * L(Mϕ[t/pi1]). Thus, by definition of subset, there exists a
trace t˜ with t˜ ∈ L(Mϕ[t′/pi1]) and t˜ 6∈ L(Mϕ[t/pi1]). Hence, Π = {pi1 7→ t′, pi2 7→
t˜} is a valid trace assignment, whereas Π ′ = {pi1 7→ t, pi2 7→ t˜} is not. On the
other hand, from (a) the following holds by Definition 5: ∀T ′ with {t} ⊆ T ′ it
holds that T ′ ∈ L(ϕ) ⇔ T ′ ∪ {t′} ∈ L(ϕ). We choose T ′ as {t, t˜}, which is a
contradiction to the equivalence since we know from (a) that Π is a valid trace
assignment, but Π ′ is not a valid trace assignment.
For the other direction, assume that L(Mϕ[t′/pi1]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t/pi1]) and
L(Mϕ[t′/pi2]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t/pi2]). Let T ′ be arbitrary such that {t} ⊆ T ′. We
distinguish two cases:
– Case T ′ ∪ {t′} ∈ L(ϕ), then (a) T ′ ⊆ L(Mϕ[t′/pi1]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t/pi1]) and (b)
T ′ ⊆ L(Mϕ[t′/pi2]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t/pi2]). By Lemma 3 and T ′ ∪ {t′} ∈ L(ϕ), it
follows that T ′ ∈ L(ϕ).
– Case T ′ ∪ {t′} /∈ L(ϕ), then T ′ /∈ L(ϕ).
Corollary 4. Given an ∃n HyperLTL formula ϕ over trace variables V :=
{pi1, . . . , pin} and two traces t, t′ ∈ TR, the following holds: t dominates t′ if
and only if
∧
pi∈V L(Mϕ[t′/pi]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t/pi]).
Theorem 8. Algorithm 4 preserves the minimal trace set T , i.e., for all t ∈ T
it holds that t is not (T \ {t}, ϕ)-redundant.
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Proof. By induction on T \ {t} and Theorem 7.
In the following, we give a characterization of the trace dominance for
HyperLTL formulas with one alternation. These characterizations can be checked
similarly to the algorithm depicted in Fig. 4.
Theorem 9. Given a HyperLTL formula ∀pi.∃pi′. ψ two traces t, t′ ∈ TR, the
following holds: t dominates t′ if and only if
L(Mϕ[t/pi]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t′/pi]) and L(Mϕ[t′/pi′]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t/pi′]) .
Proof. The ⇒ direction is the same as in proofs of Theorem 7 and Lemma 5.
For the other direction, assume that that (a) L(Mϕ[t/pi]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t′/pi])
and (b) L(Mϕ[t′/pi′]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t/pi′]). Let T ′ be arbitrary such that {t} ⊆ T ′.
We distinguish two cases:
– Case T ′ ∈ L(ϕ), then for all t1 ∈ T ′ there is a t2 ∈ T ′ such that Πfin =
{pi 7→ t1, pi′ 7→ t2} ∅ ψ. Especially, for t, there is a corresponding trace
t∗ such that {pi 7→ t, pi′ 7→ t∗} ∅ ψ, thus t∗ ∈ L(Mϕ[t/pi]). From (a) it
follows that t∗ ∈ L(Mϕ[t′/pi]). Hence, {pi 7→ t′, pi′ 7→ t∗} ∅ ψ and thereby
T ′ ∪ {t′} ∈ L(ϕ).
– Case T ′∪{t′} ∈ L(ϕ), then for all t1 ∈ T ′∪{t′} there is a t2 ∈ T ′∪{t′} such
that {pi 7→ t1, pi′ 7→ t2} ∅ ψ. Assume for the sake of contradiction there is a
t1 ∈ T ′ such that there is no t2 ∈ T ′ with {pi 7→ t1, pi′ 7→ t2} ∅ ψ. It follows
that {pi 7→ t1, pi′ 7→ t′} ∅ ψ, i.e., t1 ∈ L(Mϕ[t′/pi′]). From (b) it follows that
t1 ∈ L(Mϕ[t/pi′]), leading to the contradiction that {pi 7→ t1, pi′ 7→ t} ∅ ψ
and t ∈ T ′. Hence, T ′ ∈ L(ϕ).
Corollary 5. Given a HyperLTL formula ∃pi.∀pi′. ψ two traces t, t′ ∈ TR, the
following holds: t dominates t′ if and only if
L(Mϕ[t′/pi]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t/pi]) and L(Mϕ[t/pi′]) ⊆ L(Mϕ[t′/pi′]) .
Example 3. We show the effect of the dominance characterization on two ex-
ample formulas. Consider the HyperLTL formula ∀pi.∃pi′. (api → bpi′) and the
traces {b}∅, {b}{b}, {a}∅, and {a}{a}. Trace {a}{a} dominates trace {a}∅ as
instantiating pi requires two consecutive b’s for pi′ where {a}∅ only requires a b
at the first position (both traces do not contain b’s, so instantiating pi′ leads to
the same language). Similarly, one can verify that {b}{b} dominates trace {b}∅.
Consider alternatively the formula ∃pi.∀pi′. (api → bpi′). In this case, {a}∅
dominates {a}{a} and {b}∅ dominates {b}{b}.
For our conference management example formula given in Equation ??, a trace
{pc}∅{v} dominates {pc}∅∅ and ∅{s}∅ dominates ∅∅∅, but ∅{s}∅ and {pc}∅{v}
are incomparable with respect to the dominance relation.
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Tries. After having specification and trace analysis in place, one observation
is that there are a lot of incoming traces sharing same prefixes, leading to a
lot of redundant monitor automaton instantiations, repetitive computations and
duplicated information when those traces get stored. Ideally one wants to avoid
this overhead when monitoring a trace that shares some prefixes with already
seen traces. We implemented this idea with a so-called trie datastructure. Tries,
also known as prefix trees, describe a tree data structure, which can represent
a set of words over an alphabet in a compact manner, which exactly suites our
use case. The root of a trie is identified with the empty word , additionally
each node can have several child nodes, each of which corresponds to a unique
letter getting appended to the representing word of the parent node. So the set
of words of a trie is identified with the set of words the leaf nodes represent.
Formally, a trie is a four tuple (Σ, T ,−→, τ0) of a finite alphabet Σ, a non-
empty set of states T , a transition function −→: T ×Σ → T , and a designated
initial state τ0 ∈ T called root of the trie. Instead of ((τ, a), τ ′) ∈−→ we will
write τ
a−→ τ ′ in the following. For a trie to be of valid form we restrict −→
such that, ∀τ, τ ′ ∈ T .|{τ a−→ τ ′|a ∈ Σ}| ≤ 1.
As mentioned before, storing the incoming traces succinctly is a major con-
cern in monitoring hyperproperties. In our case the alphabet would be the set of
propositions used in the specification, and the word which is built from the trie
are the traces.Instead of storing each trace individually, we store all of them in
one trie structure, branching only in case of deviation. This means equal prefixes
only have to be stored once. Besides the obvious benefits for memory, we also
can make use of the maintained trie data structure to improve the runtime of
our monitoring algorithms. As traces with same prefixes end up corresponding
to the same path in the trie, we only have to instantiate the monitor automaton
as much as the trie contains branches.
Algorithm. Our trie-based parallel monitoring algorithm is depicted in Fig. 8.
Without using tries our monitoring algorithm was based on instantiating the
deterministic monitor template Mφ with tuples of traces. Now we instantiate
Mφ with tuples of tries. Initially we only have to create the single instance hav-
ing the the root of our trie. The trie-based algorithm has much in common with
its previously discused trace-based pendant. Initially we have to build the de-
termintistic monitor automatonMϕ = (Σ,Q, δ, q0). We instantiate the monitor
with a fresh trie root τ0. A mapping from trie instantiations to a state in Mϕ
S : T n → Q, stores the current state of our For each of the incoming traces we
provide an entry in a tuple of tries τ , each entry gets initialized to τ0. During
the run of our algorithm these entries will get updated such that they always
correspond to the word built by the traces up to this point. For as long as there
are traces left, which have not yet ended, and we have not yet detected a vio-
lation, we will proceed updating the entries in τ as follows. Having entry τ and
the correspond trace sequence proceeds with a, if ∃τ ′ ∈ T .τ a−→ τ ′, we update
the entry to τ ′ otherwise we create such a child node of τ . Creating a new node
in the trie always occures, if the prefix of the incoming trace starts to differ from
already seen prefixes. After having moved on step in our traces sequences, we
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input : ∀n HyperLTL formula ϕ
output: satisfied or n-ary tuple witnessing violation
Mϕ = (Σ,Q, δ, q0) = build template(ϕ);
S : T n → Q;
τ0 :=new trie();
i := τn0 ;
I := {i};
while p← new elements (in a forward fashion) do
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n do
i(j)←add value(i(j), j, p(j));
end
I ← ⋃i∈I{(i′1, . . . , i′n)|i(j) a−→ i′j , a ∈ Σ, 1 ≤ j ≤ n};
foreach i ∈ I do
progress every state in S according to δ;
if violation in Mϕ then
t := (rooted sequence(i(1)), . . . ,rooted sequence(i(n)));
return witnessing tuple tn;
end
end
end
return satisfied;
Fig. 8: Online algorithm using trie datastructure.
have to reflect this step in our trie structure, in order for the trie-instantiated
automata to correctly monitor the new propositions. As a trie node can branch
to multiple child nodes, each monitor instantiation will get replaced by the set
of instantiations, where all possible child combinations of the different assigned
tries are existant. S will get updated such that those new tuples are mapped
to the same state as the instantiation they were build from. We essential fork
the monitor instantiation for the different branches in the trie. After this pre-
processing we are able to update our mapping S according to δ. If a violation
is detected here, we will return the corresponding counter example as a tuple of
traces, as those can get reconstructed by stepping upwards in the tries of τ .
Note that the sequential algorithm is derived from the parallel one by pro-
gressing one trace at a time and additionally when forking the monitor instanti-
ations, only those new instantiation have to be kept, which contain the (single)
trie in τ at least once.
5 Evaluation
In the following section, we report on experimental results of our tool RVHyper
v2. We briefly describe implementation details before evaluating our monitoring
algorithms for both, the parallel and unbounded input model.
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Table 1: Specification Analysis for universally quantified hyperproperties.
symm trans refl
ObsDet1 ∀pi.∀pi′. (Ipi = Ipi′)→ (Opi = Opi′) 3 7 3
ObsDet2 ∀pi.∀pi′. (Ipi = Ipi′)→ (Opi = Opi′) 3 7 3
ObsDet3 ∀pi.∀pi′.(Opi = O′pi)W (Ipi 6= I ′pi) 3 7 3
QuantNoninf ∀pi0 . . .∀pic. ¬((∧i Ipii = Ipi0) ∧∧i6=j Opii 6= Opij ) 3 7 3
EQ ∀pi.∀pi′. (api ↔ api′) 3 3 3
ConfMan
∀pi∀pi′. ((¬pcpi ∧ pcpi′)→ (spi → vpi′))
∧((pcpi ∧ pcpi′)→ (vpi ↔ v′pi)) 7 7 7
5.1 Implementation
We implemented the monitoring algorithm for the sequential input model in
a tool called RVHyper1 [5]. We extended this implementation to RVHyper v2,
including the trie optimization technique and added an implementation of the
online monitoring approach for the parallel input model. RVHyper v2 is written
in C++. It uses spot for building the deterministic monitor automata and the
Buddy BDD library for handling symbolic constraints. We use the HyperLTL
satisfiability solver EAHyper [15, 16] to determine whether the input formula is
reflexive, symmetric, or transitive. Depending on those results, we omit redun-
dant tuples in the monitoring algorithm.
5.2 Experimental Results: Sequential Input Model
In this subsection, we report on experimental results of the algorithm for the
sequential input model and, especially, the accompanying optimizations.
Specification Analysis. For the specification analysis, we checked variations of
observational determinism, quantitative non-interference [18], equality and our
conference management example for symmetry, transitivity, and reflexivity. The
results are depicted in Table 1. The specification analysis comes with low costs
(every check was done in under a second), but with a high reward in terms
of constructed monitor instances (see Fig. 10). For hyperproperties that do not
satisfy one of the properties, e.g., our conference management example, our trace
analysis will still dramatically reduce the memory consumption.
Trace Analysis. For evaluating our trace analysis, we use a scalable, bounded
variation of observational determinism: ∀pi.∀pi′. <n(Ipi = Ipi′) → <n+c(Opi =
Opi′). Figure 9 shows a family of plots for this benchmark class, where c is fixed to
three. We randomly generated a set of 105 traces. The blue (dashed) line depicts
the number of traces that need to be stored, the red (dotted) line the number of
traces that violated the property, and the green (solid) line depicts the pruned
1 The implementation of RVHyper is available at https://react.uni-saarland.de/
tools/rvhyper/.
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Fig. 9: Absolute numbers of violations in red (dotted), number of instances stored
in blue (dashed), number of instances pruned in green (solid) for 105 randomly
generated traces of length 100000. The y axis is scaled logarithmically.
traces. When increasing the requirements on the system, i.e., decreasing n, we
prune the majority of incoming traces with our trace analysis techniques.
Optimizations in Combination. We furthermore considered our optimizations in
different combination. Note that the trace analysis and the trie optimization are
not trivially combinable and we leave this as future work. As a first benchmark,
we monitored an encoder for its robustness against errors, i.e., a Hamming-
distance preserving encoder. That an encoder preserves a certain Hamming-
distance can be encoded as a universally quantified HyperLTL formula [9]. In
Fig. 10 we compare the running time of the monitoring optimizations presented
in this paper to the naive approach. We compare the naive monitoring approach
to the monitor using specification analysis and trace analysis, as well as a com-
bination thereof. We randomly built traces of length 50. In each position of
the trace, the corresponding bit had a 1% chance to be flipped. Applying our
techniques results in a tremendous speed up of the monitoring algorithm, where
the combination of specification analysis and trie optimization turns out to be
superior for this benchmark.
For our second benchmark, we considered a black box combinatorial circuit,
guarded by a multiplexer that selects between the two input vectors i and i′ and
an inverse multiplexer that forwards the output of the black box either towards
o or o′. We monitored whether there is a semantic dependency between the in-
and outputs (see [5] for details). With random simulation, we generated traces
of length 30. Fig 11 demonstrates that the specification analysis, if applicable,
is a valuable addition to both storage optimizations. Note that both axes are
log-scaled.
Use Case: Detecting Spurious Dependencies in Hardware Designs. The problem
whether input signals influence output signals in hardware designs, was consid-
ered in [5]. We briefly describe the input specification and the corresponding
hardware designs, before reporting the results of RVHyper v2 on those bench-
marks. We write i 6; o to denote that the inputs i do not influence the outputs
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Fig. 10: Hamming-distance preserving encoder: runtime comparison of naive
monitoring approach with different optimizations and a combination thereof.
o. Formally, we specify this property as the following HyperLTL formula:
∀pi1∀pi2. (opi1 = opi2)W (ipi1 6= ipi2) ,
where i denotes all inputs except i. Intuitively, the formula asserts that for every
two pairs of execution traces (pi1, pi2) the value of o has to be the same until there
is a difference between pi1 and pi2 in the input vector i, i.e., the inputs on which
o may depend.
We applied RVHyper in both versions to traces generated from the following
hardware designs (see [5] for details).
Example 4 (xor). As a first example, consider the xor function o = i⊕ i′. In
the corresponding circuit, every j-th output bit oj is only influenced by the j-the
input bits ij and i
′
j .
Example 5 (mux). We consider a black box combinatorial circuit, guarded by
a multiplexer that selects between the two input vectors i and i′ and an inverse
multiplexer that forwards the output of the black box either towards o or o′.
Despite there being a syntactic dependency between o and i′, there is no semantic
dependency, i.e., the output o does solely depend on i and the selector signal.
When using the same example, but with a sequential circuit as black box,
there may be information flow from the input vector i′ to the output vector o
because the state of the latches may depend on it. We construct such a circuit
that leaks information about i′ via its internal state.
Example 6 (counter). Our last example is a binary counter with two input con-
trol bits incr and decr that increments and decrements the counter. The counter
has a single output, namely a signal that is set to one when the counter value
overflows. Both inputs influence the output, but timing of the overflow depends
on the number of counter bits.
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Fig. 11: Monitoring of black box circuits: runtime comparison of naive monitoring
approach with different optimizations and a combination thereof.
Table 2: Results of RVHyper v2 compared to RVHyper v1 on traces generated
from circuit instances. Every instance was run 10 times with different seeds and
the average is reported.
instance # traces # instances v1 # instances v2 time v1 time v2
xor1 18 222 18 12ms 6ms
xor2 1000 499500 127 16913ms 1613ms
count1 1636 1659446 2 28677ms 370ms
count2 1142 887902 22341 15574ms 253ms
mux 1000 499500 32 14885ms 496ms
mux2 82 3704 1913 140ms 27ms
5.3 Experimental Results: Parallel Input Model
In this subsection, we present experimental results of our optimizations for the
online algorithm in the parallel input model. As a first benchmark, we reused the
Hamming-distance preserving encoder example described above. We generated
500 traces of length 30. The results are depicted in Figure 12. The x-axis denotes
the probability that a bit of the trace is flipped. The most left hand side of the
scale means that 1 out of 10000 bits is flipped and the most right hand side of the
scale means that every second bit is flipped. As expected the trie optimization
has a major influence on the runtime of the monitoring algorithm as long as
the traces potentially share the same prefix. The specification analysis, however,
enhances the monitoring process regardless of a possible prefix equality.
6 Conclusion
We have presented automata-based monitoring algorithms for HyperLTL. We
considered three different input models, where the traces are either given in
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Fig. 12: Hamming-distance preserving encoder: runtime comparison of parallel
monitoring approach with different optimizations.
parallel or sequentially, and, when given sequentially, may either grow beyond
any bound or be limited by a fixed bound. We showed that deciding whether a
HyperLTL formula is monitorable in the parallel and bounded sequential mod-
els is PSpace-complete. We showed that deciding whether an alternation-free
formula is monitorable in the unbounded sequential model is PSpace-complete.
We presented three optimizations tackling different problems in monitoring
hyperproperties. The trace analysis minimizes the needed memory, by minimiz-
ing the stored set of traces. The specification analysis reduces the algorithmic
workload by reducing the number of comparisons between a newly observed trace
and the previously stored traces. The succinct representation of the trace set as
a trie tackles the massive storage and computation overhead for prefix-equal
traces.
We have evaluated our tool implementation RVHyper on several benchmarks,
showing that the optimizations contribute significantly towards the practical
monitoring of hyperproperties.
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